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The paper studies the labor allocation decision by households faced with non-insurable labor
income risks and establishes a case for a government sponsored public employment program
as a provider of self-insurance to such households. We study the equilibria of a two period
general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and two types of firms - a privately
owned one offering a risky wage contract and a public works program offering a relatively
riskfree one. We show that the employment level in the public program is higher in our
model economy compared to that in a benchmark complete markets economy.
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The paper studies the labor allocation decision by households faced with non-insurable idiosyncratic
labor income risks and establishes a case for a government sponsored public employment program
as a provider of self-insurance to such households. Many developing economies uses these programs
as a poverty alleviating device (see Murgai and Ravallion (2005)) and several OECD countries have
used similar programs over the last two decades, as a labor market policy tool to move the long-
term unemployed into employment or to assist the most disadvantaged segments of the labor market
(see for example, Brodsky (2000), Fredriksson (1999), Rose (2001), Dahlberg and Forslund (2005)).
A common feature of these programs across nations is that the government committs to employ a
part of the household’s labor supply at a relatively stable wage rate. The present paper analyzes
the importance of this feature as a means whereby households faced with unisurable labor income
risks can achieve a smoother consumption stream. The current literature is predominantly focused on
the effectiveness of these programs as an anti-poverty device or as a means of raising employment
levels. Little attention has been paid on their role as a provider of self insurance and the present
work attempts to ﬁll that gap. The paper complements the existing literature on formal and informal
methods of risk sharing and consumption smoothening in the presence of idiosyncratic risks (see for
example, Arnott and Stiglitz (1991), Townsend (1994, 1995), Townsend and Mueller (1998), Lim and
Townsend (1998)).
We consider an economy with multiple sectors of production, each subject to an idiosyncratic
productivity shock and incomplete asset markets, so that such shocks cannot be completely diversiﬁed
away. A working household with a sector speciﬁc skill chooses to allocate its available time between
1a private and a public ﬁrm in that speciﬁc sector. Private ﬁrms pay a wage rate equal to the marginal
product which is therefore risky. The public ﬁrms on the other hand pool their output across all
sectors together and distibute the total output as wages among all their workers. By pooling their
output, public ﬁrms are able to diversify some of their sector speciﬁc risks and the resulting wage rate
they provide is less variable than the private wage rates.
The paper compares the equilibrium employment levels in the private and public ﬁrms in our
model economy with those in a benchmark economy in which a complete set of Arrow securities are
traded - that is all diversiﬁable idiosyncratic risks are diversiﬁed away.
The main qualitative result of the paper is that the employment levels in the private ﬁrms are lower
and in the public ﬁrms higher in the incomplete markets economy compared to their counterparts in
the benchmark complete markets economy, for reasonable levels of risk aversion. Thus public ﬁrms,
by offering a relatively more stable wage rate than private ﬁrms, act as a provider of insurance in the
incomplete markets economy. Preliminary results also indicate that several factors can inﬂuence the
difference in the employment levels of the two economies - such as the degree of risk aversion, the
correlation between the sectoral shocks etc.
2 The Model
The economy consists of J sectors of production or activities, lasts for two periods 0 and 1, and
experiences S possible states of Nature at date 1. It is inhabited by a continuum of households who
are either workers or entrepreneurs. In either capacity, a household has sector speciﬁc skills which
allow it to seek employment or operate a ﬁrm in one sector or activity only, that is there is no mobility
2between sectors. We shall indicate household type by the sector in which it has speciﬁc skill.
In each sector, output is produced by numerous private ﬁrms and a state owned or public ﬁrm.
Thus a worker-household of type j chooses to allocate its available time between a private and the
public ﬁrm. At date 1, at state s, each sector j suffers a total productivity shock hs
j with probability




j f(lj,kj) where lj and kj stand for labor and capital respectively.
The private wage rate in any sector is state contingent - that is depends on the productivity shock
realized at date 1. Employment decisions however are made at date 0 and adhered to regardless of the
state of nature. The present model thus ﬁts situations in which labor is contractual rather than casual -
such as sharecropping, jobs in unionized industries etc. This further implies that production risks are
shared by entrepreneurs and workers through ﬂuctuations in the the wage rate rather than in the level
of employment. Ws
j denotes the wage rate paid to the worker in the private ﬁrm in sector j in state s.
State ﬁrms are subject to the same productivity shocks as private ﬁrms are in any sector. For
simplicity, we assume state ﬁrms to operate with ﬁxed stocks of capital. The output of the state ﬁrm







j represent labor employed by the state ﬁrm.
Private and public production functions are assumed to satisfy the usual neoclassical assumptions of
linear homogeneity and Inada conditions.
In addition to engaging in production, households can trade in ﬁnancial assets, which allow them
to diversify the sectoral shocks. In particular, households trade in equities or ownership shares of the
private ﬁrms. These are assumed to be the only assets in the economy. Thus there are J independent
assets in the economy. We assume J < S, implying that markets are incomplete and households can
3only partially diversify the sectoral shocks using these. We denote by d
j
i the share of a ﬁrm in sector
i purchased by an entrepreneur household of type j. q
j
i denotes the share of a representative ﬁrm in
sector i purchased by a worker household of type j. We denote by Qi the full price of a ﬁrm in sector
i and by V
j
s the dividend paid to the shareholders of a private ﬁrm in sector j in state s.
Finally all households have identical preferences and maximize expected utility over two periods.
The state independent utility function satisﬁes the usual Inada conditions and concavity.
Entrepreneur’s decision: At date 0, ﬁrms purchase capital stock for the next period and shares
of other ﬁrms. Denote by xj = {x
j
s}S
s=0 the consumption vector and by ej = {e
j
s}S
s=0 the given en-
dowment vector of the entrepreneur household of type j. Then the feasible consumption set of type j





































subject to the budget constraint ( 1) and given asset prices and wage rates.
Worker’s decision: A worker household in any sector is assumed to have 1 unit of time available
to allocate between the private and the state ﬁrms. Without loss of generality, we assume that working
for the private ﬁrm is costly (in terms of effort and leisure) but working for the state ﬁrm is not. The
cost of supplying labour to the private ﬁrm is cj(lj), where c′
j(lj) > 0 and c′′
j ≥ 0. Since it is costless




Denote by mj = {m
j
s}S
s=0 the consumption vector, by wj = {w
j
s}S
s=0 the endowment vector and by




































subject to the budget constraint ( 2), given private and public wages and asset prices.
Government’s decision: We assume that state ﬁrms pay a uniform wage rate across all sectors and
are also self ﬁnancing. Hence the total ouput of the state ﬁrms from all the sectors are pooled and










Note that the state ﬁrm wage rate is state contingent but uniform across the sectors because of
the pooling of output. Thus Gs has less variance than W
j
s , as the pooling of output diversiﬁes away
some of the sector speciﬁc risks. This is the key feature of the model which drives most of the results
reported.
5Finally proﬁt maximization by private ﬁrms ensure that private wages are equal to marginal prod-
ucts at each state. Moreover under competition ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts in equlibrium. Hence, output














The model has closed form solution if preferences are assumed to have constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) and shocks are normal. CARA preferences however do not satisfy the Inada conditions. This
combined with normal shocks lead to the possibility (albeit with a vary small probability) of negative
consumption in some state in equlibrium. Hence CRRA utility function is preferred. With CRRA
preferences however closed form expressions for equlibrium allocations are no longer possible. The
preliminary results reported here in the tables are therefore based on numerical solutions of the model
for reasonable parameter values.
We assume CRRA preferences, Cobb-Douglas production functions for the state and private ﬁrms
and linear disutility from labor. We assume two sectors and ﬁve states of Nature. We then solve for
the equilibrium of the model numerically for some reasonable values of the preference, technology
and shock parameters. For purposes of comparison, we also numerically solve for the equlibrium of a
benchmark Arrow-Debreu economy with the same preferences and technology but having a complete
set of Arrow securities. The numerical results are reported in Tables 1-3 and the qualitative results
6are summarized below. The interested reader is also referred to the Appendix for the ﬁrst order and
market clearing conditions which characterize the equlibrium of our model.
The main conclusion that emerges from a comparison of the equilibrium employment levels of
the private ﬁrms in our model and the benchmark economies is that these levels are higher (public
employment levels are lower) in the benchmark (complete markets) economy. By offering a wage
contract which is less variable than the wage contract offered by private ﬁrms under competitive
settings, public ﬁrms enable workers to smooth their consumption across states. Thus public ﬁrms
provide insurance to workers when markets fail to do so.
The difference between the private employment levels under complete and incomplete markets
depends amongst other factors, on the degree of relative risk aversion of workers. The difference
is higher the lower the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. As this coefﬁcient increases workers
seek employment in the private ﬁrms less and less, irrespective of whether markets are complete or
incomplete. The difference between the two cases also diminishes as a result.
The difference between the private employment levels under complete and incomplete markets
also depends on whether the sectoral shocks are negatively or positively correlated and on how high
these correlations are. A comparison of the three tables reveal this. When sectoral shocks are neg-
atively correlated, the public ﬁrms are better able to diversify these shocks by pooling together their
output across sectors. This results in a less variable wage rate across states in the public sector com-
pared to a situation in which the shocks are positively correlated. Thus public ﬁrms are able to insure
better when shocks are negatively correlated than when they are otherwise. The higher the absolute
magnitude of the negative correlation, the greater the insurance gains from working in public ﬁrms
7and the greater the difference in the private employment levels in the two cases.
The preliminary results show that public employment programs provide insurance when markets
are incomplete. It is futher reinforced by the fact that when we allow private ﬁrms to adopt a different
wage setting (instead of wages equal to marginal product) - for instance one under which a fully
informed entrepreneur take the worker’s optimal labor supply response into account in setting a wage
rate - there is no difference between the employment levels between our model and the benchmark
model (Tables 4-5).
4 Appendix I
Here we lay down the agents’ ﬁrst order and the market clearing conditions which characterize the
equilibrium of our model economy. Numerical solutions of the employment levels for selected pa-
rameter values are reported in the tables.
Individual ﬁrst order conditions



















0)Qi = 0,∀i (7)






































0)Qi = 0∀i (10)
market clearing conditions
Since all assets are shares of the private ﬁrm, in equilibrium the shares in each sector must add up










j = 1,∀j (11)
The ﬁrst order and market clearing conditions above together with equations ( 4) and ( 5) charac-
terize the equilibrium of the model economy.
5 Appendix II
This section describes the benchmark Arrow-Debreu economy against which we compare our model
numerically.
An Arrow security pays an unit of the consumption good at date 1 contingent on the realization
of a speciﬁc state of Nature. Let ps represent the price of an Arrow security which pays an unit of the
good contingent on the realization of state s. Let x
j
s represent the quantity of such an Arrow security





















s represent the quantity of an Arrow security which pays one unit of the good at state s,

















An entrepreneur of type j chooses xj, kj, lj and x
j
s for all s to maximize its expected utility subject
to its budget constraint. A worker household of type j chooses mj, lj and z
j
s for all s to maximize its
utility subject to its budget constraint.
An Arrow Debreu equlibrium is charaterized by the ﬁrst order conditions of the entrepreneurs and
workers with respect to their choice variables, the labor market clearing conditions and the following






s) = 0,∀s (14)
10The speciﬁc ﬁrst order conditions are not provided here for lack of space but are availble on
request.
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Table 1: Private employment levels under competitive wage settings in the incomplete markets and
Arrow-Debreu economies
Sector 1 Sector 2
b ¯ l1 ˆ l1 ¯ l2 ˆ l2
0.9 0.78 0.85 0.60 0.72
1.0 0.50 0.56 0.41 0.51
1.1 0.32 0.37 0.28 0.36
1.3 0.15 0.18 0.14 0.18
1.6 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
2.0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
¯ lj = private employment in sector j under incomplete markets (model economy), ˆ lj = private employ-
ment in sector j in an Arrow-Debreu (benchmark) economy, h1 = {1,6,6,1,1}, h2 = {4,1,1,2,2};
correlation = -0.75; s
µ(h1) = 0.91; s
µ(h2) = 0.75
12Table 2: Private employment levels under competitive wage settings in the incomplete markets and
Arrow-Debreu economies
Sector 1 Sector 2
b ¯ l1 ˆ l1 ¯ l2 ˆ l2
0.9 0.79 0.81 0.77 0.81
1.0 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.55
1.1 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.37
1.3 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17
1.6 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
2.0 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
¯ lj = private employment in sector j under incomplete markets (model economy), ˆ lj = private employ-
ment in sector j in an Arrow-Debreu (benchmark) economy, h1 = {2,6,6,2,2}, h2 = {4,4,2,3,3};
correlation = -0.22; s
µ(h1) = 0.61; s
µ(h2) = 0.26
Table 3: Private employment levels under competitive wage settings in the incomplete markets and
Arrow-Debreu economies
Sector 1 Sector 2
b ¯ l1 ˆ l1 ¯ l2 ˆ l2
0.9 0.81 0.83 0.77 0.79
1.0 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.54
1.1 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36
1.3 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17
1.6 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
2.0 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
¯ lj = private employment in sector j under incomplete markets (model economy), ˆ lj = private employ-
ment in sector j in an Arrow-Debreu (benchmark) economy, h1 = {2,6,6,2,2}, h2 = {4,4,3,2,3};
correlation = 0.33; s
µ(h1) = 0.61; s
µ(h2) = 0.26
13Table 4: Private employment levels under full insurance in the incomplete markets and Arrow-Debreu
economies
Sector 1 Sector 2
b ¯ l1 ˆ l1 ¯ l2 ˆ l2
0.85 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.70
0.9 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
1.0 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
1.1 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
¯ lj = private employment in sector j under incomplete markets (model economy), ˆ lj = private employ-
ment in sector j in an Arrow-Debreu (benchmark) economy, h1 = {2,6,6,2,2}, h2 = {4,4,2,3,3};
correlation = -0.22; s
µ(h1) = 0.61; s
µ(h2) = 0.26
Table 5: Private employment levels under full insurance in the incomplete markets and Arrow-Debreu
economies
Sector 1 Sector 2
b ¯ l1 ˆ l1 ¯ l2 ˆ l2
0.85 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.69
0.9 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54
1.0 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34
1.1 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
¯ lj = private employment in sector j under incomplete markets (model economy), ˆ lj = private employ-
ment in sector j in an Arrow-Debreu (benchmark) economy, h1 = {2,6,6,2,2}, h2 = {4,4,3,2,3};
correlation = 0.33; s
µ(h1) = 0.61; s
µ(h2) = 0.26
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